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PANEL DISCUSSION
THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LAW REFORM
ACT: IS IT WORKING?'
Hon. Edward R. Becker, Hon. Milton I. Shadur,Jill E. Fisch, Gregory
P. Joseph, Melvyn 1. Weiss, and DanielJ. Capra
PROF. CAPRA:2 My name is Daniel Capra and I have the honor of
occupying the Philip Reed Chair in Civil Justice and Law Reform.
This Chair is named in honor of Philip Reed, a distinguished alumnus
of the Law School. The goal of the Chair is to present public fora
such as this, discussions and exchanges of ideas on important
questions of civil law reform and ethical lawyering.
We are here today to present a panel discussion on some of the
issues that have arisen under the Private Securities Law Reform Act,
or PSLRA.3 This Act was adopted in 1995 with the intent to reform
the way that securities class actions had been brought and prosecuted
by plaintiffs' class action lawyers.
Congress thought at that time, whether right or wrong, that the
typical securities class action was one in which the stock went down,
plaintiffs' class action lawyers found some unsuspecting shareholders
to serve as lead plaintiffs, rushed to the courthouse to get named lead
counsel, ran the action without consulting the lead plaintiffs-or
anybody in the class-because they were not really involved, and then
obtained a quick settlement for a gargantuan fee. That was the
nightmare scenario of a lawyer-driven class action.
Congress wanted to change that model to one of what would be
called a client-driven class action. The thought was that in securities
class actions-as opposed to maybe other class actions, like mass
torts-it would be possible to find a lead plaintiff with enough money
at stake, enough sophistication, enough resources, so that that lead
plaintiff would control the choice and performance of counsel, rather
than the other way around, where the lawyer was controlling
everything. That is the model of a client-driven class action. It is also

1. These were the panelists' remarks at The Philip D. Reed Chair Panel
Discussion at Fordham University School of Law on February 5, 2002.
2. Philip D. Reed Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
3. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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known-and probably will be referred to sometimes tonight-as the
empowered plaintiff model.
The way the statute effectuates this empowered plaintiff model is to
gauge the lead plaintiff's status basically by the amount of economic
loss. The plaintiff with the largest economic loss is presumed to be the
"most adequate lead plaintiff," so long as that plaintiff otherwise
satisfies the requirements of Rule 23, specifically typicality and
adequacy. So there is that presumption based on economic loss.
The PSLRA further provides that "the most adequate plaintiff
shall, subject to the approval of the court, select and retain counsel to
represent the class," 4 and that select-and-retain function will be
discussed in detail tonight.
This PSLRA model of client-driven class actions has been tested in
a number of securities cases, but never on a grander stage than in the
Cendant litigation.' Cendant involved a merger of two major consumer
services companies. The books of one of them had been "cooked," I
guess that would be the way to put it, for a number of years, and after
the merger Cendant made public announcements that previous
financial statements had to be revised due to serious mistakes. Of
course, the stock dropped precipitously. Shareholders lost about $20
billion in value. Many class actions were brought against Cendant and
its accounting firm-that has some recent resonance as well, of
course-and they were consolidated in New Jersey.
The district judge appointed a group of three institutional investors,
headed by the California Pension Fund, also called CalPERS, as lead
plaintiff on the basis of that group having the largest economic loss.
CalPERS had already selected two law firms to prosecute the class
action, negotiated a fee with those two law firms, and asked the trial
judge, Judge Walls, to approve the selection of counsel and to approve
the fee. But instead of appointing those firms and establishing that
fee agreement as controlling, the court decided to hold an auction to
determine who should prosecute the action as lead counsel.
The concept of an auction would be that the qualified law firm that
gave the lowest fee would be awarded the action, with the wrinkle in
that case being that counsel chosen by CalPERS would have a right of
first refusal; they could match the lowest bid. And that is what
happened; the CalPERS counsel, those two firms, matched the lowest
bid.
The parties ended up reaching a settlement in the amount of $3.2
billion. Class counsel, pursuant to the fee percentage awarded in the

4. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v) (2000).
5. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D.N.J. 2000), affd in part,
rev'd in part 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001), remanded to 243 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D.N.J.
2003).
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auction, sought a fee of $262 million. This was $76 million more than
they had actually negotiated with CalPERS.
In the Third Circuit, and we'll talk about it-the reason I'm
bringing this up is that it is kind of the framework of the discussion
tonight-both the settlement and the attorney fee were challenged.
The court held that the district court had not erred in finding the
settlement to be reasonable, but the court reversed the award of
attorney fees by way of auction, holding that under the PSLRA, under
the circumstances presented, an auction was not permitted.6 The case
has now been remanded to determine a reasonable fee award, the
court instructing that the originally negotiated fee agreement carried a
presumption of reasonableness and should be enforced unless it was a
clearly excessive fee.7
My reading of that opinion-and Judge Becker, who wrote it, can
perhaps say more about this-is that the inference is that it was a
clearly excessive fee, that $187 million was probably way out of whack
in terms of excessiveness. But that is only an inference.
Cendant presents a dramatic example of how the PSLRA operates,
and the issues arising in Cendant present the framework for our
discussion tonight. It certainly raises questions about how the PSLRA
and its selection-of-counsel provisions will operate in the future in
cases like, for example, the forthcoming Enron litigation.
To discuss the issues of appointment of counsel under the PSLRA, I
am truly honored to have this panel, the best panel that I have
certainly ever had the luck to concoct. I would like to introduce the
panelists.
Chief Judge Edward Becker is Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit. Judge Becker wrote the panel opinion in
Cendant, and that is now really the major work on the meaning and
application of the PSLRA. He is known for his creative, groundbreaking, comprehensive, and heavily footnoted opinions-although I
must say, regarding the predicted estimate of footnotes in Cendant,
that we were expecting over 100 and were severely disappointed when
it came it in at under 100.
JUDGE BECKER: It just cost you money. You bet on it.
PROF. CAPRA: A recent tribute to Chief Judge Becker appeared in
the Pennsylvania Law Review honoring his thirty years of service on
the federal bench. After comparing Judge Becker to Holmes and
Cardozo, quite aptly, the tribute noted that he "has long been at the
6. Cendant, 264 F.3d at 277-86.
7. On remand, the district court approved $55 million plus interest in attorney's
fees as reasonable. See Cendant, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 174.
8. Stephen B. Burbank, Making Progress the Old-Fashioned Way, 149 U. Pa. L.
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forefront in developing sensible ways for addressing a variety of issues
that lie at the heart of handling modern complex litigation."'
He is a member of the Executive Committee of the United States
Judicial Conference, and earlier this year he appointed a Third Circuit
Task Force on the Appointment of Counsel in Class Actions." That
Task Force has issued a major report on the topics we are discussing
today. It will be published in the Temple Law Review," and I was
honored to be Reporter to that Task Force.
Our next panelist is Judge Milton Shadur, a Senior District Judge
for the Northern District of Illinois. In the Cendant opinion, Judge
Shadur is referred to-correctly, I believe-as "a jurist of
extraordinary distinction."' 2 Judge Shadur has been on the bench
since 1.980 and has issued more than 7,300 written opinions. He
maintains a full civil and criminal calendar and sits by invitation with
several Courts of Appeals around the country each year. He is the
Chair of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Rules of
Evidence, on which I am honored to serve as Reporter. He is the
author of two important opinions holding that the PSLRA permits a
court to conduct an auction process in securities class actions. He is
also now a scholar because he is publishing a piece in the Temple Law
Review. 3
Mel Weiss is a Senior Partner at Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes &
Lerach LLP, the leading plaintiffs' class action firm in the country,
without question. He is a leading practitioner in the fields of
securities, insurance, environmental, antitrust, and consumer
litigation, often representing plaintiffs in class actions. He has been
appointed to leadership positions in numerous complex litigations.
Most recently, he was one of the chief negotiators and lead counsel for
claimants -German Holocaust victims-in the Swiss Bank litigation
involving Holocaust confiscations. Mel was a most valued member of
the Third Circuit Task Force on Selection of Counsel in Class Actions.
Jill Fisch, my colleague, is currently the Sloan Visiting Professor of
Law at Georgetown University Law Center, but, more importantly,
Professor of Law at Fordham University School of Law. She has been

Rev. 1231, 1231-32 (2001).
9. Richard L. Marcus, The Agenda-Setter for Complex Litigation, 149 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1257, 1257 (2001).
10. Judge Becker is the recent recipient of the 20th annual Devitt Distinguished
Service to Justice Award, which honors "an Article Ill judge of national stature."
American Judicature Society, Devitt Award, http://www.ajs.org/ajs/awards/Devitt%
20Award/ajs-awards-devitt.asp (last visited Apr. 22, 2003) (on file with the Fordham
Law Review).
11. See Third Circuit Task Force Report on Selection of Class Counsel, 74 Temple
L.Rev. 689 (2001) [hereinafter Task Force Reportl.
12. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 274 (3d Cir. 2001).
13. See Milton I. Shadur, Task Force Report: "Against the Manifest Weight of the
Evidence, "74 Temple L.Rev. 799 (2001).
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at Fordham since 1989 and teaches primarily in the areas of corporate
and securities law. She has a truly remarkable-and I envy it every
day-record of scholarship, which includes work on corporate law,
securities regulation, and federal courts. She has published in the
Harvard Law Review, Columbia Law Review, and Cornell Law
Review, among other places. Her article on lead counsel auctions in
Law and Contemporary Problems14 was cited shamelessly multiple
times in the Third Circuit Task Force Report-indeed, it formed the
basic premise of that report. Her most recent article on lead counsel
auctions will be published in the April 2002 volume of the Columbia
Law Review. 5
Greg Joseph heads Gregory P. Joseph Law Offices and is a Fellow
of the American College of Trial Lawyers. Last year he was listed as
one of the top ten litigators in America, a designation truly deserved.
He is a former Chair of the 60,000-member Litigation Section of the
American Bar Association, served on the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and is the author of several books,
including books on civil RICO, modern visual evidence, and sanctions
in the federal courts. Greg served as Co-Chair of the Third Circuit
Task Force on the Selection of Class Counsel-so you see where we
are going here-and he was formerly Chair of the Litigation
Department at New York's Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson.
The format today is to have opening statements by the panelists and
then a free-flowing exchange, followed by questions from the
audience. We open with Judge Becker to take us through some of the
most interesting issues raised by the PSLRA that he tackled in
Cendant.
JUDGE BECKER: Professor Capra has presented a great challenge,
though one that I hope that I will be able to meet, talking with as
great celerity as Professor Capra. I am a fast-talking Philly guy, so
let's see if I can do it.
I am delighted to be here. I have long been impressed with
Fordham as an institution. The adjective that I have always thought
best characterizes Fordham is "class." As my comments suggest,
Fordham has got a lot going for it, but for me its number one
attraction is the presence on its faculty of a man whom I consider one
of the American legal academy's true superstars, Dan Capra.
If I were looking for adjectives to describe Dan Capra, I would use
brilliant, incredibly productive, indefatigable, personable, decent, and
just a wonderful human being. I know this because I know his

t4. See Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff,
60 Law & Contemp. Probs. 167 (1997).
15. See Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of
Class Counsel by Auction, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 650 (2002).
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teaching, I have taught with him at ALI/ABA programs, I have read
his scholarship, and I know his work as a Reporter for the Advisory
Committee on the Rules of Evidence and his work as Reporter for the
Task Force on Selection of Class Counsel, which I appointed a little
over a year ago. Dan did the report, and he turned out a very
important and very useful report in a year's time. You can read it not
only in your materials, soon in FRD, but also in the Temple Law
Review where Judge Shadur will "take it to the cleaners," as he will
this afternoon.
Now, to the topic, "The Private Securities Law Reform Act: Is It
Working?" Well, we are only dealing with a portion of the topic. The
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act covers a host of subjects. It
is in many respects largely a pleading statute; it also has safe harbor
provisions. It has a whole bunch of provisions, but we are focusing
here today on whether it is working in terms of selection of lead
plaintiff, and ultimately the selection of lead counsel.
My Cendant opinion you can find in 264 F.3d. It is a 125-page
opinion.
It covers a lot of ground. It also contains some
recommendations to Congress, something that I as a judge have
always felt it appropriate to do. I have been doing it for many, many
years, and sometimes the Congress thinks I am right'and changes the
laws. In my view, there are facets of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act that really need to be looked at because it has not worked
out in a number of respects in the way in which Congress thought it
would work out.
Now, that said, while I have played a role by creating the Task
Force, have in mind that I am also a judge. We have all heard of the
Iron Age. We are now in the "Enron Age," and there is going to be a
lot of litigation, including some that may show up in the Third Circuit,
so I've got to be pretty careful what I say, because there are a ton of
issues-a ton of issues raised by the Task Force Report, a ton of issues
raised by this general subject-and many may be coming before the
Third Circuit, and so I will be circumspect in my remarks, which I will
use more to identify issues or questions than to give answers. But I
will discuss some of the things I have done in Cendant, and I will make
a few remarks about the Task Force Report.
The first big issue, the one that Professor Capra raised, is the
selection of lead plaintiff. There is a rebuttable presumption in one of
the sub-sub-sections of 21(d) of the Act that "the court shall adopt a
presumption that the most adequate plaintiff in any private action
arising under this chapter is the person or group of persons"-that
itself raises a question you can already see in terms of aggregation, as
to whether the lead plaintiff is one person, one fund, a group of funds,
how many, what's the limit-"that ... in the determination of the
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the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the
court, 1has
6
class.
Congress originally thought that institutions in this new clientdriven, as opposed to lawyer-driven, regime that it was creating would
be the lead plaintiffs, but it really has not turned out that way. The
only institutions that have agreed to be lead plaintiffs are public
pension funds and a few union-related institutions. By and large, the
mutual funds was the group that I think Congress had in mindbecause they've got more stock than anybody in any of these
corporations that go sour-but the mutual funds won't touch it.
Doing a cost/benefit analysis, they think that it just ain't worth it for
them to get involved. So the mutual funds have not come forth as
lead plaintiffs. The private pension funds have not.
But the public pension funds have stepped up. Though that, in and
of itself, has raised a question because public pension funds are in
many cases controlled by politicians, and politicians get campaign
contributions. The question arises then as to whether the lead
plaintiff, a huge public pension fund, will select lead counsel on the
basis of political contributions made by law firms to the public officers
who control the pension funds and who, therefore, have a lot of say in
selecting who counsel is.
Now, I identified this as a problem in my Cendant opinion. I
suggested that Congress do something about it. The Task Force has
addressed it and has said that there ought to be disclosure of any
contributions. There are others who think that the Ethical Rules
require more than disclosure. I am simply identifying problems here.
I will not talk long about the question of aggregation. I just read
you the language, which says that Congress seemed to have
contemplated aggregation. In Cendant I rejected the notion that the
statute precludes a group of unrelated individuals from serving as lead
plaintiff. But the question arises as to whether a group is too large.
Are you aggregating a group that is too large so that you become the
largest and you become the lead plaintiff?
There are professional responsibility issues. The SEC filed a brief
with us in Cendant, which said "groups with more than five members
are too large to work with effectively." I simply state that this is an
issue, it is a problem, and Congress is going to have to work it out one
of these days.
Another issue that I see is that Congress did not foresee that large
institutional investor lead plaintiffs would, perforce, retain a
substantial investment in the defendant corporation. If they are big
enough to be the lead plaintiff, they are not going to dump all their
stock when something goes down; they are going to hold on to their

16. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I) (2000).
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stock. The little guys, the little investors, who are the bulk of the class
members, they are not going to hold on to their stock.
What this means is that a corporation that retains a substantial
interest in the defendant corporation arguably cannot represent a
class in a lawsuit because this lead plaintiff will likely be conflicted
between trying to get the maximum recovery for the class and trying
to protect its ongoing investment in the corporation -that is, for
example, by settling cheaply or by securing corporate governance
changes in lieu of cash, which will make the corporation healthier
down the road. I simply identify this as another problem.
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, is it working? Well,
there are problems.
The selection of lead counsel-and this really gets to the heart of
the great controversy, in my view-as I expressed in Cendant, is
dependent, at least in part, on the ability of lead plaintiff to negotiate
the best deal with lead counsel. That is something that is not always
considered. But the selection of lead counsel is the big-ticket item in
this new regime.
The empowered plaintiff-that is, in this client-driven vs. lawyerdriven regime, as Professor Capra describes it-Congress has said that
this empowered plaintiff is the one who gets to select lead counsel,
and the notion is that the sophisticated plaintiff with the largest stake
will negotiate the best deal, and not only will be able to negotiate the
best deal, but also will be able to monitor counsel. This is a concept
that I think is just coming into play. I pointed out to the drafters at a
rules conference Judge Shadur and I were at in Chicago that this is
one of the things that needs to be thought about.
In the ordinary course, under the lawyer-driven model, the classic
example was that there was a lawyer in Philadelphia who had an uncle
who had shares in every major corporation in the United States.
Whenever there was something in The Wall Street Journal,right away
he jumped in and he represented the class. Well, that was the
paradigm, and maybe exaggerated, of the lawyer-driven model.
But then, in a case like that, there is no monitoring-the client isn't
monitoring counsel. But presumably, if you have a huge state pension
fund, the notion is that it will drive a hard bargain and that it will
monitor the activity of counsel. So monitoring is another area we've
got to think about.
In any case, the big-ticket item, to use that phrase again, is whether
or not the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act permits auctions.
I concluded in the Cendant case that, except in certain circumstances
where the lead plaintiff isn't really doing its job or can't do the job,
auctions are inconsistent with the Act. Judge Shadur has a different
view.
But have in mind in terms of auctions that there are other areas
where lead counsel are selected-antitrust cases, consumer cases-
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which are not constrained by the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act, and the question of whether auctions are permissible is very
much a live issue there.
The best example right here in New York City is the auction house
cases, where there is an antitrust action against Sotheby's and
Christie's. There was an antitrust violation. Judge Kaplan of the
Southern District of New York selected lead counsel via an auction. 7
But in any case, there is an issue as to whether it works. The Task
Force, in seventeen pages, goes into the pros and cons-I know Judge
Shadur is going to talk a little about it, and I am not going to talk
about it here-but it goes into the pros and cons of a private ordering
versus auction which is supposed to mimic the market.
I was impressed enough, I will say candidly, with the resultsindeed, it was Judge Shadur's success in the Lysine case, 8 where a
Philadelphia firm, which I know is one of the finest plaintiffs'
securities and antitrust firms in the country, Harold Kohn's firm, was
the low bidder. Nobody could say they weren't going to do a great
job. And they did a great job, and apparently saved the class a lot of
money.
But there were also a lot of criticisms against the auction method,
and you can read 100 pages of them, as to problems of the auction
method in the Task Force Report. I said, "My God, what does a
newly minted-one of you is appointed to the U.S. District Court in
the Southern District of New York, and your third day on the job, on
the wheel, you get a class action. What do you do? You've got to
select class counsel. So do you do it by auction or do you do it by the
conventional private ordering method?"
I thought the Task Force would come up with a report that would
aid in analyzing the situation. I thought the Task Force, led by Greg
Joseph and Steve Saltzburg, and with Dan Capra as Reporter, did a
brilliant job of exposing the pros and cons.
And, although the Task Force Report is viewed as largely negative
to auctions, I would point out that the Task Force is careful to state
that "[d]espite its reservations, the Task Force is not prepared at this
early stage to conclude that a court should never have the discretion
to conduct an auction,"1 9 that there may be certain limited situations
where it is justified. And it said: "The Task Force was persuaded by
the testimony of many witnesses who urged that courts be encouraged
to innovate and find creative solutions to these important issues."20
And, among other things, the Task Force believed that auctions
would be a good laboratory for coming up with evidence to solve the
17. See In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
18. See In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. II.

1996).
19. Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 740.
20. Id. at 740 n.177.
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most difficult, if not intractable, problem, and really the deep
underlying problem in this whole arena, the question of fees, because
that is the real issue.
Put differently the real issue is: Do you have an auction which fixes
the fee ex ante ("we agree to do it for X percent"), or the traditional
private-ordering method in which the fee is decided ex post by the
judge? But there again, in 78u-4(a)(6), Congress has provided in the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act that the court shall see to it
that fees shall not exceed a reasonable amount.
So there is ultimately an ex post role for the court, which influenced
me in Cendant to say, "Well, even though you've got the presumptive
lead plaintiff"-and in that case it was felt that the lead plaintiff was
properly selected-"the auction didn't necessarily work there because
the auction price was much higher than the negotiated price." So the
notion doesn't always work.
At all events, I held that if the fee that is negotiated between lead
plaintiff and lead counsel is clearly excessive, then the court can
review it-and, indeed, even go so far as to apply a lodestar crosscheck.
One final disclaimer. The Task Force Report is not Third Circuit
law. It is not binding on any panel of our court. It was independent.
It was not part of our judicial business. I did that as the presiding
judge in connection with our Judicial Conference, which is to improve
the administration of justice, and I thought that it did.
But the short of it is-and I am going to stop talking, because these
folks here really are in the trenches and they know more about it than
I-I hope that what I have done is to tell you that there are some
issues we've got to grapple with, some problems we've got to deal
with, and, I think, some legislation that needs to be enacted.
JUDGE SHADUR: Well, it is obvious that Judge Becker's long
opinion in Cendant-itwas '125 pages in slip; I think they reduced it to
something like 85 in Federal 3rd-certainly serves as a starting point
for any kind of discussion in these areas. I think that the West key
numbers and the table of contents are longer than most opinions.
But lest you think that that is a magnum opus for Judge Becker, I
remember one issue of Federal Supplement, when he was a very
distinguished district judge, that contained opinions that he had
written in the Japanese electronics cases, 1 which ended up in the
Supreme Court as Matsushita.2 And if I remember right, it was about
21. In an eight month period, Judge Becker issued 495 pages of opinion in four
Matsushita decisions published in volumes 505 and 513 of Federal Supplement. See
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100-1338 (E.D. Pa.
1981); 505 F. Supp. 1125-90, 1190-1313,1313-80 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
22. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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500 pages of his opinions. We used to refer to that advance sheet of
Federal Supplement as "Federal Becker" instead of "Federal
Supplement."
But to return to the business at hand, I was told that because I can't
rely on Tennyson's "my strength is as the strength of ten because my
heart is pure," I am entitled to get four times as much time as any of
these people, because I am the only one who I think sees some very
good sense in the use of bidding as part of the selection process,
including in the Private Securities Law Reform Act, which I'll refer to
as "the Reform Act," although I think that's a euphemism.
The reason that I say that-and by the way, "auction" is a very bad
name for this. It seems to be prevalent all down the line, but it is
really bad. The reason is that it suggests price only. That is what
auctions typically are. When we deal with competitive bidding in this
situation, it is not price only. We want to make sure that whatever
firm ends up representing the class is going to be a high-quality firm,
good credentials, experienced, and that is a precondition to anybody
being selected in that way.
I wanted to talk about the potential use of competitive bidding as
part of this process for determining "the most adequate plaintiff," as
the Reform Act requires.
Let me begin with one initial premise on which Judge Becker and I
certainly share common ground. In Cendant he quoted with approval
this proposition that I had set out in my opinion in the Bank One
Shareholders litigation. And it is important to listen to this:
Suppose for instance a plaintiff in such a presumptive status has
agreed that its own lawyers, if acting as class counsel, are to receive
one-third of any class recovery. Suppose further that another highly
reputable law firm that has appeared of record for another putative
plaintiff or plaintiffs, having demonstrated excellent credentials in
earlier securities class action litigation and being clearly capable of
handling the complexities of the current lawsuit, is willing to handle
the case for half of that percentage fee-or to provide even a greater
contrast, is willing to work for that lesser percentage and also to
impose a cap on the firm's total fee payment. In that circumstance
the presumptive lead plaintiff could certainly bind itself
contractually to pay one-third of its share of the class recovery to its
own lawyer, but any court would be remiss if it were to foist that
one-third contingency arrangement on all of the other class
members 23who had not themselves chosen that law firm to be their
advocate.
At that point we part company, I know, as a matter of statutory
construction. In my view, the example that I posed meshes with the
23. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 274-75 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting In re
Bank One S'holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 784 (N.D. 11. 2000) (second
emphasis added).
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provision of the Reform Act that permits the presumption-and
remember, it is a presumption, not a conclusive one-that the
shareholder group with the most financial stake is in fact the most
adequate plaintiff, to be rebutted, among other things, "upon proof by
a member of the purported plaintiff class that the presumptively most
adequate plaintiff.., will not fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class." 24 That, of course, is a provision that essentially
mirrors the adequacy prong of Rule 23 that applies to all putative
class actions, whether securities or otherwise.
As you have heard from Judge Becker, he finds such an ex ante
effort to evaluate fee proposals to be generally at odds with the
Reform Act. Instead, to serve as a kind of means to ensure what we
are all looking for-and that is the maximization of benefit to the class
out of any recovery, a common fund that is obtained usually through
settlement or trial-the Cendant panel looked to the ex post
obligation of the court, which says: "Total attorneys' fees and
expenses awarded by the court to counsel for the plaintiff class shall
not exceed a reasonable percentage of the amount of any damages
'25
and prejudgment interest actually paid to the class.
That, of course, is very much the same as the common law as it has
developed under Rule 23 in all kinds of class actions, and that is
viewed as providing adequate protection of the class.
It struck me in thinking about this problem for today's panel that
posing a realistic scenario would help to sharpen the case for an upfront look at the level of fees, rather than simply relying entirely on
that ex post standard. Assume a major securities class action-not as
big as Enron-with the typical array of lawsuits by prospective lead
plaintiffs whenever any kind of stock has fallen out of bed with the
release of bad news and the contention is that the company should
have gone public with the information earlier. Assume also that
examination of the several cases and the people who are interested in
it, after the publication of notice that the Securities Act requires,
shows one major pension fund or a group of related employee benefit
funds has by some margin the largest amount at stake. That fund or
those funds have retained Mel Weiss's firm under a formula that calls
for fees amounting to 10% of the first $20 million recovered, 20% of
the next $20 million, and 30% of everything over that. That kind of
increase-in-percentage arrangement has been urged, I know, by Mel's
firm as important to create the maximum incentive for maximum
effort and maximum recovery. For the minute I am going to skip my
disagreement with the need for that kind of approach in terms of
ethical aspects of the profession, but I am going to accept it.

24. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(ll) (2000).
25. Id. § 78u-4(a)(6).
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Now segue to the end of the case. Mel's firm does a terrific job and
ends up with a $100 million settlement for the class. Under the
formula, 10% of the first $20 million is $2 million, 20% of the next $20
million is $4 million, and 30% of the next $60 million is $18 million, so
you end up with a total fee of $24 million on the $100 million: 24%.
If you look at the cases, that is within the range of so-called
"norms" that have been approved in a great many class actions. So
what we have had here under the Securities Act is a major
shareholder, a major stakeholder, who retained a very highly
reputable, highly experienced, high-quality law firm. And under
Cendant, unless such a consideration as a comparison with what I
think is the much-discredited lodestar calculation shows that fee to be
seriously problematic, that is the end of the matter.
But should it be? My suggestion is not at all. Although the use of
competitive bidding up-front has been limited to only about 15 cases,
believe it or not, up to this point experience suggests that such socalled "norms" as a 24% cost to the class represent a lot of money out
of the pocket of the class that a healthy degree of competition would
put back into the pockets of the clients rather than the lawyers.
In two of the three cases that I have handled with the use of bidding
as one component-and I emphasize one component-of the
determination of who is going to be the class representatives-one of
those cases was under the Securities Act, as Ed Becker has reflected;
the other one was in an antitrust action, the Lysine case-but in each
instance, the successful bid proved to be only 6 percent of the
common fund recovery, and each of those involved a settlement in the
$50 million range.
In the third case, which is a still-pending securities class action-I
can't comment on it for that reason, because I don't know the resultbut I do know that the successful bidder representing the presumptive
lead plaintiff came in with a 7.5% bid.
Vaughn Walker of San Francisco is the one who had first done this,
and he has done it, I think, in more cases than anybody else-I know
he has-and he has obtained quite similar results.
In my two cases, what that meant was that close to $10 million went
into the pockets of the class members in excess of the amount that
would have been the case under the so-called "norms." Whether
under the Reform Act requirements of no more than a reasonable
percentage to be awarded to counsel, or under the case law that has
developed under Rule 23, the court's role is satisfied in cards and
spades.
My own court of appeals-you know, I come from where they like
to think of themselves as "the land of free competition," because all of
you know the economists who view cost/benefit as the answer to
everything. Those of us on the district court, I think, differ, but we
must do as our seniors tell us. They haven't had a chance to talk
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about this in the Reform Act context. I know the Ninth Circuit has
pending a mandamus action against Judge Walker that Mel Weiss's
firm has brought, stemming from his rejection of a putative class
representative that was represented by the firm,26 so I'm making no
comment obviously on the merits of that.
But as maybe could have been anticipated from the land of law and
economics from which I emanate, here is what the Seventh Circuit
said in its Synthroid class action.27 That happened to be one that was
RICO and antitrust and some supplemental jurisdiction state law
claims, but what they say I think is equally relevant here in the
securities field:
We have held repeatedly that, when deciding on appropriate fee
levels in common-fund cases, courts must do their best to award
counsel the market price for legal services, in light of the risk of
nonpayment and the normal rate of compensation in the market at
the time.

... On remand the district court must estimate the terms of the

contract that private plaintiffs would have negotiated with their
lawyers, had bargaining occurred at the outset of the case (that is,
when the risk of loss still existed). The best time to determine this
rate is the beginning of the case, not the end (when hindsight alters
the perception of the suit's riskiness, and sunk costs make it
impossible for the lawyers to walk away if the fee is too low). This is
what happens in actual markets. Individual clients and their lawyers
never wait until after recovery is secured to contract for fees. They
strike their bargains before work begins. Ethically lawyers must do
this, but the same thing happens in markets for other professional
services with different (or no) ethical codes. Many district judges
have begun to follow the private model by setting fee schedules at
the outset of class litigation-sometimes by auction [-what are you
going to do'?-], sometimes by negotiation, sometimes for a
percentage of recovery, sometimes for a lodestar hourly rate and a
multiplier for risk bearing ....

Timing is more important than the

choice between negotiation and auction, or between percentage
and
28
hourly rates, for all of these systems have their shortcomings.
Now lest you think that I am really plumping for the idea of bidding
at all costs, that's really not so. Let me emphasize another point of
basic agreement between what you've heard from Judge Becker and
what you hear from me, although we do draw different conclusions as
to the utility of competitive bidding.

26. See In re Cavanaugh, 3)6 F.3d 726, 739 (9th Cir. 2002).
27. See In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2001).
28. Id. at 718-19.
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Suppose the presumptive lead plaintiff really tested the market in
terms of fees-for example, by inviting a "beauty contest" among
interested law firms, or by conducting the kind of private equivalent
of competitive bidding to select a really high-quality, experienced law
firm prepared to handle the case at the least costly fee arrangement.
At that point I don't think there is any need for judicial involvement
in the identity of counsel, and I cheerfully relinquish that role.
But you see the problem is that the real world doesn't function that
way. That is very expensive. It is time-consuming. Putative class
representatives do not have any assurance that they are going to end
up as lead counsel. There is not a lot of incentive for them to invest
their time and money to beat the bushes in that way. Instead what
happens is they file suit using the firm they have had a relationship
with in other matters, or a firm recommended by their usual counsel.
And what that does, then, is not to provide the kind of assurance that
I think the court is entitled to when it talks about ordering how the
matter gets resolved.
I am going to defer talking about a number of the other items
because I think I've overused my welcome in any event, despite my
allocation that Dan was good enough to give me.
MR. WEISS: I would like to approach this from the standpoint of
real-life problems for the lawyer. To me, the issues really are how
lawyers in the class action context can properly evaluate the risks
ahead and their staying power, and how much it will likely cost in
time, effort and expense to maximize the recoveries for the clients, on
an ex ante basis versus ex post.
I have represented clients, both private and in class actions,
throughout my career. When a private client walks in, they tell me a
story, a story in which they have a personal involvement. For
example, they have dealt personally with the prospective defendant in
a business transaction, or they bought securities in a private
placement, and they can give me a relatively detailed set of facts or a
perspective that really is much easier to evaluate from the standpoint
of likelihood of success.
In a class action, we have a totally different environment. We have
people who are very remote from the wrongdoing that is being alleged
in the complaint or that brings them into your office. They generally
have, even in the case of sophisticated institutional investors, very
little understanding of what happened that caused them the injury.
And, by the way, in almost every one of these cases it's not the
institutional investor that walks into the lawyer's office in the first
instance; it is a relatively small investor, at least relative to the
institutional investor, who typically commences the inquiry.
Now, you are the law firm that has to make a decision: Am I going
to throw resources into the investigation, huge resources sometimes,
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in order to come up with enough information to satisfy myself that
this case should be brought? To what degree am I willing to take the
risk of making that expenditure? Am I willing to build up an arsenal
of expertise within my law firm to be able to do a proper investigation
up-front, have forensic experts, and hire investigators?
In my firm we have 550 people. We have something like 190 fulltime lawyers. The rest are support people. These people are
expensive to maintain. I have to get paid adequately in order to
maintain that arsenal of support and that ability to do an
investigation.
And then, under the PSLRA, I have to take the risk that I am not
going to get appointed lead counsel because some other firm comes
forward with a proposed plaintiff, at the end of a sixty-day rat race for
clients, who suffered bigger financial losses. In other words, even
though my firm may have spent significant resources developing the
case, if another firm comes in with a client who suffered larger losses
than my clients, that firm will likely be appointed lead counsel, even
though they didn't put up resources up-front to investigate and start
the case. In Cel/Star, as an example, which was one of the first battles
over who should be lead plaintiff and who should be lead counsel, we
filed an extraordinary complaint and then had the case given to an
institutional lead plaintiff who expanded the class period in order to
make its loss larger. That plaintiff and its lawyer then settled that case
based upon the pleadings, without any depositions at the time of the
settlement, and the lawyer who got that client wound up getting all of
the fee. Now, my firm spent something like a quarter-of-a-million
dollars on that case up-front and got nothing back.
So, from my perspective, I see an environment where certain law
firms lie in the weeds, with relatively little overhead, waiting to
"cherry pick" the best cases with the lowest bid. These law firms are
not willing to put in the resources up-front to protect victims in our
society and are simply not prepared to take all manner of cases
because they do not have the arsenal to do so.
Those lawyers who are the "cherry pickers" aren't necessarily bad
lawyers-they will meet Judge Shadur's test of adequacy-but have
they met the test of willingness to make the investment to truly
protect the clients?
Now, take Enron as an example. We still don't know who is going
to become the lead plaintiff and the lead counsel, and at my firm we
have spent easily $1 to 2 million investigating that case. At this point,
there is an institutional investor with a much larger loss, individually,
than our client's largest loss. We have a client, the University of
California Regents, that lost $144 million. This other one has a loss of
$300 million. Leaving aside the suspicious circumstances of how that
$300 million was lost, why should the court necessarily have to pick
that plaintiff and its lawyers over another institutional investor that
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has certainly a large enough loss to do an adequate job, or to be
willing to do an adequate job, to protect its investment? After all, our
client, the Regents, manage a big fund, and it hired a law firm-my
firm-that was willing to take all the risk and spend the money to do
the job right.
Another interesting thing about the PSLRA is that we are dealing
up-front with the appointment of lead plaintiff; we are not dealing
with class representative. The lead plaintiff isn't necessarily the one
who is going to be held out as the class representative later in the case
when the court rules on class certification, and the PSLRA does not
make that a requirement.
So let's assume you have sub-classes. Take Enron: there are people
who bought bonds and preferred stock, there are 401(k)-type
purchasers, there are ordinary open-market purchasers, there are
people who bought during different class periods. For example, one
large proposed lead plaintiff, Florida's pension fund, bought all of its
stock between mid-August and December of 2001. How do you
figure out which claims within that panorama of claims are the
stronger ones, and which are the weaker ones?
You are also in competition for recoveries with other claimants,
such as contract holders, and secured and unsecured creditors.
Connecticut has a quasi-public organization that gave Enron $220
million on December 28, 2000, in exchange for a payout over eleven
years. I don't think it got its first payout. I am sure that $220 million
was reported as profit on the books of Enron. But it's a contract
claim. And claims like that are all over the place, in huge amounts, so
there is going to be a tremendous competition for dollars.
And how do you know who is going to have the priority for those
dollars, or whether those dollars are going to be adequate to pay 5%
of the losses or 10% or 20%, even if you get all of the resources of
those defendants?
These are huge risks, and I happen to believe that the best approach
to fees is to wait until the end when the court can review how the case
was handled, and what the results were. The court is ex post in the
best position to evaluate all of the factors that should be evaluated
that go into the fee award.
Now, Judge Becker was dealing with an interesting situation. He
had Cendant. The lawyers had a contract with their client. By the
way, I think their client was the New York City and New York State
retirement funds; it wasn't CalPERS.
JUDGE BECKER: CalPERS was lead and New York City and New
York State.
MR. WEISS: Oh, right, there were three of them, okay.
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JUDGE BECKER: Three of them.
MR. WEISS: Right, and it was New York City, I think, that had the
contract...
JUDGE BECKER: Correct.
MR. WEISS: ... with the lawyers that had the cap.
In that case, as I recall the underlying facts, the lawyers were told by
the court that the court wanted an auction. So the court set the rules.
At the end, there was only, I think, $9 million in lodestar. It was
relatively low in relation to the amount of fees awarded.
JUDGE BECKER: Eight million was on the record, but they said it
would have been higher. They said it would have been $14 million,
$15 million, something like that.
MR. WEISS: All right, so we'll give them $15 million, give them $20
million, whatever.
The point is, and I've been there, that lawyers do get incentivized
by the fee arrangement. I remember in the Keating cases, Judge Bilby
set out a fee scale where we got increasing percentages as the amount
of recoveries went up, because I think it is pretty well known by all of
us who practice that the last dollars are the toughest dollars to
recover. You know, it is very easy to fold your tent at $200 million,
but it is very hard sometimes to go from $200 million to $300 million.
And that is where you earn your money as a lawyer. In my book, the
endgame is the most important.
And I know clients, private clients, to whom I've spoken many
times about this, and they want their lawyers to be on the same
yardsticks as they are. They want the lawyers to have the same
incentive as they have to go for the bigger dollars and not fold their
tent because there is a lot of risk and not that much more reward. So
they give the lawyers a bigger reward for the bigger dollars.
I measure outcomes by the net recovery, not by how much the fee
percentage is.
I will never forget what Judge Jack Weinstein did in the Franklin
National Bank case, way back in the 1970s. There were three of us
vying to obtain recoveries from the defendant: the FDIC, the trustee
in the bankruptcy, and the plaintiff class (which I represented). We
were on the eve of trial, and the way it was supposed to work was the
FDIC would put on its case first, the trustee second, and then I would.
I went home on a Friday after we opened to the jury. The FDIC was
supposed to start on Monday.

2003]

PSLRA PANEL DISCUSSION

2381

I get a call that night that the FDIC and the trustee settled. Judge
Weinstein said: "All right, Mr. Weiss, you're up on Tuesday." I said,
"Judge, this is not fair. Give me one week." He said, "I want you to
settle this case for X." I said, "I'm not going to take X."
So I held out and Judge Weinstein gave me a week to prepare. The
next Monday, the defendants offered me two times X. Judge
Weinstein called me in and he said, "I'm prepared to give you a 50%
fee." I said, "That's a lot of money, a big percentage." He said, "You
earned it." He said, "If I gave you a third of X, the class would have
gotten less than they will get with 50% of 2X." And he was dead
right. So I made an application for 40%. He gets on the bench and he
says, "Granted. I'm not even writing an opinion. For 50%, I would
have written an opinion. For 40%, I'm not."
That told me a lot. It taught me a lot about how to measure
outcomes. Judge Weinstein understood it very well. You have to
look at this situation at the end, look back, and then you make the
fairest allocation.
To me, this front-end approach to setting counsel fees is taking too
much responsibility away from the courts. The courts have an
obligation and responsibility to award fair fees, which are not only fair
to the class, but are also fair to the lawyers. Windfalls work both
ways: the lawyer can get a windfall or the class can get a windfall.
Neither should be permitted. We should try to avoid windfalls either
way.
In our society, when the clients wind up with, let's say, 90% of the
recovery, to me, that's a windfall for the client. Whether it is a
justifiable windfall is a very difficult question.
I think that you cannot divine whether the Cendant lawyers would
have gotten $3.2 billion with another fee arrangement. You cannot
get into their hearts and souls and minds and you cannot understand
what they went through in the endgame, but the fact is they got a $3.2
billion recovery for the class. They got $3.2 billion.
Percentage fees align lawyers with their clients, and replicate the
market, and that is also why I like percentage approaches. As the
Circuit Court said in the Continental Illinois case, the judge is not
there to decide what. the fairest and the best fee is, but what the court
should do is try to replicate what happens in the marketplace.2" I
know from long experience that the most sophisticated clients do not
even hesitate to enter into a 25 or a 30% agreement, no matter how
big the case is. In Pennzoil, Joe Jamail got his full fee from Pennzoil,
and given the huge recovery he obtained for his client I am confident
that Pennzoil paid Joe's percentage fee with pleasure. And Vinson &
Elkins, the same thing, in another major case where I think they got a
$750 million fee, and I think it was like a one-third percentage fee
29. See In re Continental Illinois Secs. Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cir. 1992).
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arrangement. Clients, sophisticated clients, want to give incentives to
their lawyers and do not hesitate for a minute to pay their lawyers well
when they do well on a contingency basis.
PROF. FISCH: Each time I participate in one of these discussions of
class action reform, I am struck by the ambivalence that we have
about the class action structure in general. Listening to Dan's recap of
the motivation for the Reform Act, one concern that I see-a
dominant concern among Members of Congress-was frivolous
litigation: meritless lawsuits, strike suits, and so forth. Many of the
provisions in the Reform Act are designed to cut down on frivolous
litigation.
When Judge Becker said, "Well, there is this concern that
institutional investors might still be invested in the company, they
might have a conflict of interest, they might not fully reflect the
interests of the in-and-out plaintiffs," maybe some Members of
Congress thought, "Well gee, having such institutional investors act as
lead plaintiffs may be a good idea because that makes litigation more
consistent with societal interests. If litigation decisions are made by
investors that are representing the market as a whole, instead of the
day traders or whatever, maybe we'll wind up with a better
benchmark of socially productive litigation."
I guess what I am saying is that there are a lot of people who think
there is too much litigation, there should be ways of cutting down, and
that going for the maximum recovery and the maximum number of
cases filed isn't necessarily a good idea.
But I said we are ambivalent about this. On the other hand, we rely
on the class action mechanism, on private attorneys general, to deter
wrongdoing and to compensate victims-victims of securities fraud in
this case, but also victims of mass torts, victims of consumer fraud and
antitrust violations, and all different kinds of wrongdoing. We rely
very heavily as a society on private litigation, and we do not put the
same kind of resources into government investigation and government
enforcement that we would need to dedicate if we did not have an
effective class action mechanism.
Well, for class actions to be successful at compensating victims and
deterring misconduct, we've got to have the right incentives for class
members, and particularly for class counsel, because class counsel is
behind the class action mechanism, right? That is no surprise. That is
no great flaw in the system. That is the way the system is designed to
operate. If we structure a system in a way that deters lawyers from
filing cases or awards lawyers the minimum amount necessary to get a
lawyer to take on a case, we may not maximize our compensation and
deterrence objectives.
So how do we balance between these two visions? How do we deal
with these two competing goals in the class action structure?
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I think what is interesting about the Reform Act is that Congress is
not trying to make all of these value judgments. Congress is saying:
"Okay, here is an area in which we've got the possibility of private
plaintiffs and empowered lead plaintiffs, let us strengthen the market
structure so that perhaps it can deal with some of these issues."
Obviously it is going to take some time, and it is going to take a
certain degree of restraint by the courts. If the courts get too heavily
involved in deciding what appropriate lead plaintiff qualifications are,
many lead plaintiffs are not going to get in the game-they do not
want to compete. The cost/benefit analysis may not make sense
anyway for some lead plaintiffs-such as mutual funds-but you can
bet it does not make sense if an investor cannot be assured of being
appointed lead plaintiff when it has the largest stake. Institutions in
particular will be unwilling to face a lot of collateral litigation on
issues such as: are they really bona fide lead plaintiffs, how did they
acquire the stock, and do they fairly represent the interests of the
other investors? Similarly, institutional investors will legitimately be
concerned about the prospect of burdensome discovery of the lead
plaintiff, the lead plaintiff's holdings, the lead plaintiff's transactions,
and the lead plaintiff's potential conflicts of interest. Will the lead
plaintiff face accusations of "pay to play," which, so far as I have seen
and so far as my research has uncovered, have thus far proven
completely unfounded? These problems will dissuade institutional
investors before they ever have the chance of getting involved.
Then, assuming we overcome that hurdle and they do get involved,
what kind of say are they going to have in selecting lead counsel? I
have talked to institutional investors who say, "Look, if I am going to
design a 'beauty contest,' if I am going to set standards, if I am going
to evaluate a bunch of different potential lawyers, I want to know that
at the end of the day I am going to be the lead plaintiff and I am going
to make the selection decision. It is no good to me to be involved in
the case if I've got some lawyer foisted upon me with whom I am not
familiar and whose style is not compatible with mine. That is not what
I want to do. I would not have that relationship in anything other
than the class action context. Why should I go out of my way to look
for that sort of thing?"
So I think the message or the concern that I would raise for courts is
that we do not really know how well the lead plaintiff provision is
going to work, but we need to allow it a certain amount of flexibility
until it finds its course, until institutional investors figure out what
they need to do and how to operate effectively within the constraints,
before we go back to Congress and say, "Here's some fine tuning," or
before the courts get scared and say, "This is something with which we
really are not comfortable, and we need to take control."
Progress reports to date on institutional lead plaintiffs are pretty
good. Sure, institutional investors are not involved in a majority of
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securities fraud cases, but the number is growing. There are probably
a couple of dozen public pension funds that have been involved in
securities fraud cases. I did an eyeball analysis of the securities fraud
filings in 200.1, and institutional investors either sought lead plaintiff
status or were appointed lead plaintiff in over ten percent of those
cases.
And if you look at the types of cases, it is not really surprising that
the number is not higher. A very large number of the filings are cases
involving a relatively small amount of money, cases in which there is
no competition for the lead plaintiff position, cases that are resolved
either as a result of, or shortly after, a motion to dismiss. I am not
surprised that an institutional investor would not show up in every
single case. That is not an indication that the lead-plaintiff provision
is not working or that institutions are unwilling to get involved.
In the cases where institutions are involved, as I said, they are
designing procedures; they are trying to come up with standards for
the attorney selection process and standards for fee agreements.
Institutions are experimenting with different types of fee
arrangements, things that the courts have not invented on their own.
Institutions are developing fee structures designed to create the
different structures that try to take into account the various incentives
that Mel Weiss talked about, that take into account the deterrence
objectives of securities litigation as well, the desirability of sometimes
proceeding against the more difficult defendants, the individual
defendants in some cases, for which the case may be harder to bring,
not just going for the company and the amount of the insurance
coverage. So those sort of experiments, I think, are going to bear fruit
if we give them a little bit of time to develop.
The biggest problem that I see under the statute right now is
uncertainty-uncertainty about what the lead plaintiff role is, what
the courts are going to accept, and so forth. We have talked about the
lead plaintiff's role in selecting counsel today, but we have left a host
of issues on the table without even discussing them.
What is the lead plaintiff's role in settlement? If the lead plaintiff
opposes a settlement that counsel comes forward with, at some point
in the case, should that objection be given any weight? Should the
court defer to that objection?
Traditionally, in standard class actions, the class representatives are
figureheads.3 They do not really have an active role in terms of
litigation strategy once the case has been filed. Courts have held that
the objections of a class representative to an appeal decision or a
settlement decision are not entitled to any substantial weight. So will
institutional lead plaintiffs, will empowered lead plaintiffs, have more
30. See. e.g., Fisch, supra note 14, at 172-74 (describing the limited role of the
class representative in standard class actions).

2003]

PSLRA PANEL DISCUSSION

2385

substantial power to affect litigation decisions, or does their role stop
at the point when they select counsel?
What about this much-touted monitoring function of the lead
plaintiff? What happens if the lead plaintiff says at some point during
the case, "I am not happy with the job the lawyers are doing. They
are spending too little time or they're doing things that I think are
wasteful from the class's perspective?" Will there be any judicial
willingness to back up that sort of a concern? And, if not, can we
really expect institutional investors-or any lead plaintiff-to monitor
effectively?
So I think there is a lot of potential for experimentation, for
innovation. I think that looking, at least under the PSLRA, at other
mechanisms for solving the class action problem, is likely to interfere
with that natural development. Obviously, securities lawsuits are not
the only types of class actions.
There may be room for
experimentation in other areas. I have suggested that the empowered
lead plaintiff model might be very effectively extended to areas
beyond securities litigation, such as derivative litigation.3"
But the empowered lead plaintiff model is not going to be the
answer in every case. It is not going to be the answer in consumer
fraud; it is not going to be the answer in mass torts. So this does not
mean that our search for how to solve the problems of class actions is
at an end. It is, I think, just a beginning, and a promising beginning at
that.
MR. JOSEPH: It is always a pleasure to begin speaking after the time
that Dan had hoped to begin a panel discussion.
I was taken by Judge Shadur's comments about Judge Becker's
opinion, which I thought were quite delicate. He noted that the
volume of the opinion was reduced from 125 pages in the slip opinion
to eighty-five pages in F.3d. I think, regrettably from his perspective,
none of the text was lost in that reduction.
I am going to talk about two aspects of what has been broached so
far: one is the auction and the second is the most-adequate-plaintiff
model.
Now, the Third Circuit Task Force did not say "never" to auctions.
I mean, you really cannot say never about much of anything. I am
reminded of the scene, both in Butch Cassidy and in The Fugitive,
when there are occasions when one would jump into a flood of water
150 feet below one, but one does not do it frequently.
My comments are not going to be directed to Judge Shadur, to
Judge Kaplan, to Judge Walker-we have had superb jurists that
address these issues. But there are systemic issues in setting lawyer
fees up-front to bear in mind.
3 1. See Fisch, supra note 15, at 724-25.
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The first is that the judge has to have a basis for deciding how to set
a fee structure, and that basis is going to come from ex parte
communications-which will bear on the merits-from one side of the
case, from the plaintiffs' perspective. That is something that makes
defendants quite unsettled. Corporations already consider themselves
targets when they are sued in class actions, and they are quite
unsettled at the prospect that their side of the story is not being heard.
Not only does the judge hear about the merits, the judge then sets
incentives based upon an understanding of the merits. Again, I am
not concerned that that is going to have any impact on Judge Shadur
when a motion to dismiss is brought before him. There may be other
judges about whom other clients would have concerns.
JUDGE SHADUR: Pardon me for interrupting. I have never, and I
would never, consider an ex parte communication in connection with
any of these matters. It just has not happened. I do not know where
you got this, but it is just wrong.
MR. JOSEPH: All right. Let me continue about how these things are
often done, which is that the bids are always submitted to the court in
camera. There is nothing that the defendant can look at. And the
communications that the judge considers have to take into account the
merits sufficiently to permit the court to determine a likely range of
results, which necessarily entails an assessment of the merits and
prospective recoveries. And I accept Judge Shadur's observation that
he has never considered the merits of the case. I do not know how a
judge can determine how properly to incentivize counsel without
taking into account the merits. And I can assure you that corporate
defendants are convinced that this is exactly what is happening when
these in camera matters are sent to the court and the other side is not
being heard.
The entire structure of the PSLRA contemplates that when the
most-adequate plaintiff is set, the defendant may not be heard. The
statute is very clear that objections to a putative "most adequate
plaintiff" may come only from another plaintiff, not a defendant.
So we have the judge looking at whatever the judge considers is
necessary on the merits in order to set incentives for the plaintiff.
Then, the judge knows what the incentives for the plaintiff are, which
the judge has set, at the time the judge rules on a variety of matters
that come before the court-motions to dismiss, for partial summary
judgment, in limine attacks on damages evidence, and the like. The
judge knows exactly how his or her ruling will financially impact
plaintiff's counsel.
As I said in the beginning, I am not suggesting that this affects any
of the three jurists I mentioned who have conducted auctions. It is a
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significant concern, and a perception concern, on the part of
defendants when this is done.
Fourth, there is a real question as to whether we have any way of
ever knowing that a better recovery, net to the class, has ever been
accomplished in an auction. We know that we have gotten good
recoveries, very good recoveries, and even excellent recoveries, given
the incentives that were provided. We do not know, because
settlement value is a function in part of who counsel are, what the
recoveries otherwise would have been.
I remember my friend Lester Brickman from Cardozo had a theory
some years ago about tort cases: that lawyers were being overpaid,
and that this was demonstrably true because any lawyer could come in
and get the same recovery. It is preposterous. Who is on the other
side of a case largely determines both the quality of the representation
and the value of the case. A case with Edward Bennett Williams for
the plaintiff, and the same case with Joe Blow for the plaintiff, has
dramatically different values. So we cannot assume that the net
recovery is likely to be the same where two different lawyers or firms
come in with different bids. That one came up with a very, very fine
result given a certain set of incentives is not an indicator of how other
counsel, with other incentives, would have performed.
I also would suggest that courts are not replicating the market when
they conduct auctions. When I am retained, when Mel is retained,
when any lawyer is retained in security cases, you are dealing with a
sophisticated client with a sophisticated general counsel. They do not
just look at who happens to knock on their door. They make inquiry
by talking to a whole array of sources that are not available to a
judge-other general counsel, other clients, other adversaries-many
other kinds of information that they have at their disposal. It is not on
the basis of written submissions with information limited to that
selected by the submitter.
So while the auction is an attempt to replicate the market, and I
credit it as that, the fact is it is not a replication of the market. It is
something that an academic may perceive as a replication of the
market. It is nothing like the market that exists for legal services in
New York City, or in any other major city in the United States.
We also know that if you as judge set a fee formula in an auction, all
you are setting is a cap. It is extraordinarily unlikely to me that you
are ever going to permit counsel to exceed that cap. They have
agreed to eight percent, twelve percent-why would you give them
more? But it is certainly not a floor, because we know that the court
has the obligation under Rule 23 and Cendant to reduce it if the
amount is unreasonable, as exactly the court should do.
So the Task Force conclusion was that there may be circumstances
where an auction is appropriate, but they are not the norm. There are
paradigmatic cases, and a number of the cases that have spawned
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auctions fit the paradigm: There is clear liability-is Enron a case of
clear liability?-and there is also clear collectibility, which there
certainly is not in Enron. And there are a lot of qualified people that
are very interested in bidding for the lead counsel role.
Now, Enron is a PSLRA case. It raises unique statutory issues, so
that is a separate kind of circumstance. But it is down in the Fifth
Circuit. They may not agree with Chief Judge Becker32 that the
PSLRA precludes auctions.
If you have a case, where there is clear collectibility, there is clear
liability, and there are a large number of competing bids, an auction
may be something to consider, and we would not preclude that. That
is the auction paradigm.
Let me turn to the most-adequate-plaintiff issue because I think
that the concept of an empowered plaintiff is one of those things that
corporate America deserves for having created it.
This is what you get when you get the most-adequate plaintiff:
" You get a new set of lawyers that know nothing about the field
of securities litigation and law-these are the general counsel at
the client;
" You get a new set of clients that not only know nothing about
the law, but also generally have other fiduciary duties that they
must consider at the same time they assume the set of fiduciary
duties associated with most-adequate-plaintiff status. This
conflict explains why no private mutual fund gets into this.
Professor Fisch talks about institutions, but if you look at the
names, these things all sound like institutions, but some of these
institutions are very, very tiny entities. You know, they are not all
CalPERS or the City of New York or the State of New York. They
are often a small pension fund for a small local of a small union. You
know, there are institutions and then there are institutions.
So I think that the interposition of a "most adequate plaintiff"
makes it more difficult for corporate America to be able to settle
these cases, which is fine with me. That is something they wanted.
They wanted Eliot Weiss's article; they have Elliot Weiss's article.
Elliot Weiss is now going to be arguing for Judge Walker33 in the
Ninth Circuit as to why Chief Judge Becker is wrong. And that is
perfectly fine. He is the law professor who wrote a Yale Law Journal
article that happened to come out just before the Republican
revolution, and that is why we have the PSLRA.3
If you look
substantively at that statute, I think it turns out to be a blip on the
32. And now with the Ninth Circuit, In re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 726 (9th Cir.
2002).
33. Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
34. See Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring:
How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104
Yale L.J. 2053 (1995).
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screen in terms of the substantive pleading changes. The only thing it
has done is help protect accountants like Arthur Andersen from joint
and several liability. That is the one lasting testament of the PSLRA.
PROF. CAPRA: I just have a couple of questions, and then feel free
to just jump in.
If you are not holding a class counsel auction, I guess the
alternative-or at least one big alternative-is what has been referred
to as "private ordering." I think, for the audience perspective, we
ought to say what that means.
What private ordering means is that the putative class counsel come
up to the judge and say, "This is the way we have arranged to have
lead counsel, and we have arranged the situation where this firm is
lead counsel, this firm does this, this firm does that." Essentially, it is
kind of a consortium of counsel.
One of the things that the Task Force recognizes is that there may
be problems with private ordering, in that the court is presented with
an arrangement of counsel, and who knows if that is the most efficient
arrangement? So, for example, what might be happening is that, since
everybody is fighting to be lead counsel, everybody is kind of cut in on
the pie, everybody is cut in on the deal.
I have a question for the judges. Judge Becker, if you would, what
do you do if you are a district judge-newly minted, as you say; or
even older minted, as might be said-when somebody comes to you,
firms come to you with a private ordering arrangement, and maybe
you suspect it is not the most efficient arrangement? What would you
do in that situation?
JUDGE BECKER: Well, you ask a lot of questions. You ask an
awful lot of questions.
The problem with these cases is that district judges are
overburdened and they will take the path of least resistance very
often-more likely if they are new, but not necessarily-and many of
them will not ask too many questions, and they say, "You talk about
private ordering; this is the order that we live under," and they will go
along.
But if they ask questions, then they ought to depend on the answers
because, as the tenor of your question suggests, there are a lot of very
disturbing things that can happen, and it is not necessarily always
And there are professional
going to be on the up and up.
responsibility questions. The law of professional responsibility has
grown and grown and grown, and properly so. There is a lively
dispute as to whether the district court has a fiduciary relationship to
the class. I do not think that, in the strict sense, the district court has a
fiduciary relationship to the class, just as a judicial commission on the
rove is not a roving commission to do good. But the district judge has
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got a lot of suasion and can have a lot of clout and can point out
problems.
Whether or not the district judge has a fiduciary
relationship in the strictest sense, the district judge has huge clout, has
huge power. It has power over the selection. It has power-of course,
we are talking about class actions, but a lot of this happens in MDL,
where there are steering committees and liaison committees-and all
of this has got to be approved by the court.
If the judge will have courage and stand up and ask a lot of right
questions, the judge may say, "Uh-uh, don't do it this way; don't do it
that way."
MR. WEISS: Can I make a point on this? I am drafting an article on
what drives fees in complex cases. I came to it because we
represented the FDIC a number of years ago in a major case against
Ernst & Young down in Tennessee arising out of the Butcher Bank
failures. We were under a lot of pressure from our clients to keep the
fees down. It was a federal agency, and I think we incurred something
like $26 million in fees and $12 million in out-of-pockets for experts
and the like. At the end of the ball game, the FDIC settled all of its
claims all over the country, whichever banks they were involved in, for
something like $400 million. We were already at trial, and our case
was the only one that had advanced beyond the pleading stage.
About three or four months ago, there was a trial in New York
County Supreme Court between the insurance companies, the excess
carrier and the primary carrier that insured Ernst & Young. It was
revealed in the coverage action that the amount of defense costs in the
FDIC v. Ernst & Young case was $126 million. I was stunned. I was
stunned.
When you see what goes on on the defense side of these cases, you
can start understanding why we on the plaintiffs' side frequently need
multiple law firms to respond effectively to the defendants' litigation
tactics, and how defense strategies can drive the amount spent on the
plaintiffs' side.
Now, why should the courts get involved in all of that? I mean, they
can't really be cops policing all of the ways cases are litigated. Those
defendants on the other side are "sophisticated." It is their money at
stake and they are letting it happen. We have to react to it.
In my view, the only way you can really handle this efficiently is
with a percentage approach and using the criteria, applied on an afterthe-fact basis, that the circuit courts have generally established for
awarding fees.
JUDGE SHADUR: Well, I have been at this business a long time,
thirty years in practice before I took the vows of poverty, and I was on
both sides of class actions. I am very sympathetic to a number of the
things that Mel Weiss has pointed out.
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But I must tell you that the product of that and another two decades
on the bench has left me with less confidence than he has in the
omniscience of federal judges when it comes to evaluating fees at the
end of the case, because you have to have a benchmark against which
you are going to be making your judgment. And if the benchmark is
the result of these fictitious percentages that have grown out of the
P.I. model that existed when lawyers were always getting a third
because that was what they charged their clients, and then that
somehow gets translated into a totally different animal, I find that
very troublesome. One plus that has to be recognized as coming out
of even a limited amount of experience in the use of competitive
bidding is that those so-called "benchmarks" have in fact been
demonstrated not to have a lot of reality in terms of need.
I did not start out subscribing to the notion of using bidding. As a
matter of fact, what happened was that I had a case-in 1990, I think
it was-in which I was presented with the product of what happens
with the Manual on Complex Litigation, which dictates you have a
lead counsel, you have a liaison counsel, you have a committee of
counsel, and I had something like fourteen law firms seeking to feed
at the trough. One of them was a Philadelphia law firm, highly
involved in class action litigation, in which the guy had done nothing
really other than to draft a complaint, which was not used, and he was
putting in for his time in those days, a decade ago, at $400 an hour.
When I went carving through the thing as best I could-dealing
with it in hindsight and from the outside is very difficult for anyone,
omniscient or otherwise-I carved the thing down from maybe an
aggregate of-this was small-we're talking about millions. The late
Everett Dirksen was fond of saying that, "A billion here and a billion
there, pretty soon you're talking about real money." In this case, I
think the total fee requested was only about $400,000, and I cut it
down to about $350,000. I dropped a footnote in the opinion that
said: "You know, next time around, if I am presented with this, maybe
I am going to think about what Vaughn Walker has done"-at that
time he had done that in the Oracle litigation.
You see, one of the problems with the notion of bidding is that
there is not a model for bidding either. One of the big difficulties is
that if you look at them, you know, you can pick flaws, and I recognize
that in each one of the methods.
For example, I do not think that the judge knows enough about the
case at the beginning to set up a grid in which the judge says "for the
first so many million you fill in the blank, for the next so many million
you fill in the blank," to the bidding lawyers. That makes it easier to
compare, but it makes it infinitely more difficult for the judge to feel
that there is any validity.
35. In re Telesphere Int'l Secs. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 716, 721 n.12 (N.D. Il. 1990).
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My own approach to the problem has been, instead, to let the
lawyers design their bids. Now, what that does-and this is the reason
I hated to be sharp with my good friend, Greg Joseph-but you see
what that does basically is to present a judge with a difficulty of
evaluation because at that point, with lawyers having designed very
different bids, the court's problem becomes one of figuring out which
bid is better, and that necessarily involves making some assumptions
that may create crossover points.
Law firm A's bid may be better at one dollar level but worse than
B's at a different dollar level. Now what happens at that point is not
an ex parte communication, at least in my experience, but rather one
in which counsel for plaintiffs and defendants are asked, "What is
your best judgment as to what the maximum recovery would be if the
plaintiffs were right?" Surprisingly, sophisticated lawyers usually
come out pretty close on that kind of assumption.
The difficulty that comes is in what the late Hu Will used to refer to
as "the Lloyd's of London approach." And that is, "what is the
probability of success?" If that process results in the evaluation of
what Nathan Detroit said in Guys and Dolls-you know: "Nothing in
life is four-to-one, most things are six-to-five and take your pick"-if
that process makes it difficult for me, I would then abandon the use of
the bidding process.
It is not a panacea. It is a tool, and I think it is a useful tool, and I
think it is a useful tool in the private securities class action as well,
because it provides information, and it is information that is not
otherwise available in terms of evaluating things that at the end of the
case, as was quite accurately pointed out, the court is obligated to do.
PROF. FISCH: I wonder if we are talking about two different states
of the world here. I mean, Judge Shadur, you talk about a very
thoughtful and careful implementation of the auction procedure, but,
at the same time, you are worried about the courts that are not going
to do that, and those are exactly the same courts that are going to just
say, "Well, all right, 33%, that is the standard benchmark, I won't give
it very much thought."
The auction does not give those judges better tools because unless
they correctly identify which is the right case for the auction, unless
they recognize the problems with the auction procedure, unless they
design their auction carefully, whatever information they come up
with will not be reliable. Similarly, it is precisely these courts that will
not know what to do with the information that they obtain.
JUDGE SHADUR: Well, how many cases do you need that produce
6%, 7.5%, 10%, in order to recognize that maybe a third or 25% is
not always the right answer?
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PROF. FISCH: I completely agree. But you know what? A court can
do that without an auction, and courts have. They do it all the time. I
mean, the Prudential Insurance case in New Jersey, 4.8% of the
recovery, in a case involving "extraordinary risk"; 36 the Goldberger
case in the Second Circuit, 4% of the recovery;37 the NASDAQ
antitrust case, 14% of the recovery.x You know, judges are doing this
without using an auction.
MR. WEISS: The Prudentialcase, just to get the record straight, was a
negotiated fee. I negotiated it, and I was severely underpaid.
PROF. FISCH: The courts adjusted that afterwards.
MR. WEISS: No, it was not adjusted.
PROF. FISCH: Well, they suggested that you were underpaid.
remanded and it was reaffirmed. It was awarded
MR. WEISS: It was
39
end.
the
at
full
in
MR. JOSEPH: Well, let me just give you a fact scenario from a real
class action. The announcement that causes a stock to go down was
made on March 7. There was a press release on January 25. There
was an investor conference on February 15. There was an investor
conference on March 1.
The determination of the potential recovery is a function of which
of those or how many of those actually give rise to liability. How far
back was it that the company potentially knew the bad news? Now, if
it. was March 1, damages are about $600 million; if you go back to
February 15, damages are potentially $2 billion; and if you go back to
January 25, they are potentially $4 billion.
Now, to set the fee to the extent that anybody asks me to assume it
is January 25 or February 15 or March 1, 1 can have my economist do
a plaintiffs' model and I can tell you within 10% what the plaintiffs are
going to come up with. Not that I consider that a valid analysis, but I
could have that done.

36. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 106 F. Supp. 2d 721,
735-36 (D.N.J. 2000).
37. See Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 51-53 (2d. Cir. 2000).
38. See In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 187 F.R.D. 465, 485-88
(S.D.N.Y. 1998).
39. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 572
(D.N.J. 1997), vacated in part by 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998), remanded to 106 F. Supp.
2d 721 (D.N.J. 2000).
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But if you are setting a fee in which the amount of the recovery
matters, then the issue is going to be how far back you are going to go.
That is the kind of area where, if submissions are being made to
explain to the court why "my bid is better than his bid, because I am
willing to go back to January 25, because here are all the bad things
that I can tell you happened," that is merits-oriented. It is what makes
defendants very uncomfortable about this whole process.
MR. WEISS: You left out some other complicating factors.
there partial revelations along the way?

Were

MR. JOSEPH: That happens in every case. That is a separate issue.
MR. WEISS: That is the point. I meanMR. JOSEPH: It gets too complicated if you get into real life, Mel.
PROF. CAPRA: But the risk of uncertainty and how we deal with it is
the basic issue. On behalf of the panelists, I would like to thank you
for attending this most interesting discussion of problems arising
under the PSLRA.

